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Tort Law and
Commonsense Justice:
Convergence and Divergence
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Valerie P. Hans

M

ost judges, by necessity, work case by case, addressing only the legal questions that must be decided to
handle that case. For many, there’s little opportunity
to reflect on how the law may change over time—either about
how and why those changes may occur or about whether such
changes are for the better. In this article, we analyze the links
between tort law and legal practice on the one hand and psychological notions of justice on the other. We explore situations in which commonsense notions of justice have converged with legal doctrine and legal practice in tort cases, creating changes in tort law, as well as circumstances in which tort
law and legal practice have diverged from commonsense justice. We think judges will enjoy having the chance to step back
from day-to-day case consideration to reflect on these intriguing patterns in tort law and practice.
In his book on commonsense justice and law, Norman
Finkel described a dispute at his university that arose each
spring. The grounds crew carefully maintained walking paths
in a grassy quad, but students ignored those paths and created
their own, romping along the once-beautiful grass until bare
earth began to show. The grounds crew reseeded, placing
“Keep Off” signs around the tender area. But the signs were
routinely ignored, and the new grass failed to thrive. Finally,
the grounds crew laid new sod on the bare earth just in time
for late spring graduation. The following spring, the cycle
repeated. Eventually, the grounds crew conformed their paths
to the improvised student paths, breaking this perennial cycle.
Finkel analogizes this dispute to the challenge raised by divergence between law and commonsense ideas of justice, asking:
“Should the law follow the path laid by community sentiment,
or should the community follow the path the law has laid?”1
When it comes to tort law, we see much convergence
between the law and community sentiment—places where tort
doctrine and psychological intuition are aligned—with tort
law both reflecting and shaping community views of civil justice. Convergence is understandable, even to be expected in
many cases. Many societal and cultural expectations, values,
and norms are embedded in the form and content of laws. Over
time, commonly shared ideas of justice in torts are incorporated into specific legal rules.
However, we also see instances in which law and intuition

This article draws on material from the authors’ book, JENNIFER K.
ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW, published in 2016 by the NYU Press.
Footnotes
1. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF LAW
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diverge. In some cases of divergence, it seems that the differing
assumptions of the law and the tendencies of human psychology can quietly coexist. In other cases, the perceived legitimacy of the tort system may be undermined when the law
diverges from community sentiment. And in still others, psychological tendencies may run counter to the legitimate purposes of tort law.
CONVERGENCE

At the intersection of psychology and torts, we observe
many instances in which the two paths coincide, instances in
which psychological intuitions are in accord with the foundational principles and rules of tort law. One example of this pattern is the shift from contributory to comparative negligence in
most jurisdictions. The classic 1809 English case of Butterfield
v. Forrester2 ushered in the English regime of contributory negligence, a legal doctrine that was quickly adopted in the United
States and proved to have considerable staying power. Many
defendants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
availed themselves of the defense of the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence. Proving that the plaintiff was even slightly at fault
in causing his or her own injury completely barred recovery.
But over time, the wisdom of refusing to hold negligent defendants liable—particularly when their victims were much less at
fault than they were—was increasingly questioned. Such an
approach was hard to justify on either deterrence or compensation grounds. Juries operating under a contributory negligence regime reportedly practiced, under the table, a rough
version of comparative negligence. They were said to reject
defense verdicts in favor of reduced awards for negligent plaintiffs who contributed to their own injuries.
Eventually, the contributory negligence regime’s complete
bar to recovery fell out of favor. In most U.S. jurisdictions, it
was replaced with comparative negligence, an alternative that
reduces rather than bars recovery. When the negligence of both
the plaintiff and the defendant constitute legal causes of an
injury, lay observers favor responsibility and damages that are
proportionate to the responsibility of each party. The current
laws of most states are now in accord with this commonly held
community view of justice.3 Tort law has followed the path laid
by the community.

1 (1995).
2. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.
1809).
3. Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified
Comparative Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945 (2012).

Another example of the convergence between tort law and
psychological intuition comes from the rules of causation.
Consider the classic case of Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., the
“twin fires” case, in which two independent fires of roughly
equal size combined into a single fire and destroyed the plaintiff’s property.4 What makes such cases interesting is that they
cause problems for the standard rule for causation in tort law,
the “but-for” rule of causation. The difficulty lies in the fact
that even if only one of the fires had occurred, the plaintiff’s
property would still have been destroyed. Nevertheless, when
asked to evaluate causation in such cases of multiple sufficient
causation, people still tend to attribute causation to each of the
two causes (the fires). Or consider another situation involving
multiple sufficient causes in which two snipers simultaneously
fire at a victim, both shots hit their mark at the same time, and
either shot would have been sufficient to cause death. In such
a case, people tend to classify both snipers as causal, even
though a straightforward counterfactual analysis would indicate that neither shooter is a but-for cause.5
This lay intuition is consistent with an exception to the butfor rule of causation, as embodied in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, which provides that “[i]f multiple acts occur, each of
which . . . alone would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s),
each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”6 The commentary to the Restatement affirms this intuitive connection:
Perhaps [the] most significant [justification for this
exception] is the recognition that, while the but-for standard . . . is a helpful method for identifying causes, it is
not the exclusive means for determining a factual cause.
Multiple sufficient causes are also factual causes because
we recognize them as such in our common understanding of causation, even if the but-for standard does not.
Thus, the standard for causation in this Section comports with deep-seated intuitions about causation and
fairness in attributing responsibility.7
Thus, both the shift from contributory to comparative negligence and the exceptions to but-for causation are consistent
with lay intuitions about causation.
DIVERGENCE

Yet in other instances, we see divergent paths, places in
which psychological predispositions are at odds with tort-law
principles. To continue an earlier example, although comparative responsibility accords with current societal norms, some
states continue to employ contributory negligence regimes. In
4. See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
5. Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation
between Counterfactual (“But For”) and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010).
7. Id. at cmt. c.
8. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia still employ contributory negligence. Peter Nash

four states and the District of
[T]he jurors
Columbia the plaintiff’s contribugenerously
tory negligence remains a com8
plete barrier to recovery. But
interpreted the
strict adherence to the legal facts in the case
regime of contributory negligence
and its vestiges in modified forms to allow them to
of comparative negligence can reach what they
produce results at odds with com- considered to be
monsense justice. These instances
a just result.
may lead fact finders to engage in
motivated reasoning about the
evidence to arrive at a just result
in the case.
Consider an experiment that presented a product-designdefect lawsuit to mock jurors. The case included evidence of
defective design, as well as testimony that supported an inference of plaintiff fault. One group of mock jurors was given
comparative negligence instructions, and asked to assess the
relative responsibility of the defendant and the plaintiff. Other
jurors were instructed to decide the case under contributory
negligence rules. Only 8 percent of those who received the
comparative negligence instructions concluded that the plaintiff was not at all responsible. In contrast, 24 percent of those
deciding under contributory-negligence instructions found
that the plaintiff was not at all at fault, a finding that permitted
recovery.9 In short, the jurors generously interpreted the facts
in the case to allow them to reach what they considered to be
a just result.
This experimental study is consistent with analyses of outcomes in real-world civil jury trials. Eli Best and John Donohue examined two large national samples of civil jury trials
from 2001 and 2005, focusing on those cases in which the jury
attributed a percentage of negligence to the plaintiff.10 In pure
comparative-negligence jurisdictions, where partial recovery
was permitted even when plaintiff fault was greater than 50
percent, juries found that plaintiff responsibility exceeded 50
percent in 22 percent of the cases. In modified comparativenegligence jurisdictions, where plaintiff recovery would be
barred if juries found that plaintiff responsibility exceeded a
threshold around 50 percent, relatively few juries (7.5 percent)
found the plaintiff’s responsibility to be above 50 percent.
Compared to their counterparts deciding cases in pure comparative-negligence jurisdictions, the juries in modified comparative-negligence jurisdictions found lower levels of plaintiff
responsibility (particularly in the 40–49 percent range, and at
exactly 50 percent), ensuring that plaintiffs would receive
some compensation for their injuries.11
Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributory Negligence and Adopt a Comparative Negligence Defense in
Its Place, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 359, 360 n.8 (2011).
9. Kristin L. Sommer, Irwin A. Horowitz and Martin J. Bourgeois,
When Juries Fail to Comply with the Law: Biased Evidence Processing in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2001).
10. Best & Donohue, supra note 3.
11. Id. at 976.
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These studies suggest that
fact finders are motivated to
perceive, construe, and discuss
plaintiff responsibility in a way
that allows recovery when they
believe that recovery would be
just. Courts are sometimes sensitive to this tendency. Consider, for example, a decision
by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in which the court
adopted a modified form of the
comparative negligence rule
that bars the plaintiff’s recovery if the plaintiff is found to be 50
percent or more responsible. The court hesitated to credit a
jury’s 50–50 split of the responsibility to the plaintiff and the
defendant because the jury made the allocation without having
been instructed about the consequences of that allocation.12
The rules of contributory negligence and modified comparative
negligence, therefore, cause problems for the justice intuitions
of fact finders and may motivate them to find workarounds that
allow them to fulfill their concepts of justice.
Another related instance in which the law and lay intuition
are at odds is in the calculation of damage awards in comparative-negligence cases. The processes by which we ask jurors
and judges to make and report their comparative decisions and
to calculate final damage awards do not appear to comport
with the psychological tendencies of fact finders, ultimately
inviting what has come to be known as “double discounting.”
Consider what we ask fact finders to do when defendants
raise the plaintiff’s fault as a defense. Fact finders must first
determine whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving
that the defendant acted negligently and that such negligence
was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Then, they must
determine whether the defendant has met the burden of proving that the plaintiff acted negligently and that this negligence
was a legal cause of the injury. Next, fact finders must determine the percentages of responsibility that ought to be
assigned to the defendant and to the plaintiff. Separately, they
must calculate the total amount of damages suffered by the
plaintiff without regard to this division of responsibility. The
final step is the reduction of the total damage award by the percentage of plaintiff responsibility. In many jurisdictions, if the
fact finder is a jury, this final task is done by the court.
As we described above, fact finders may be motivated to
ensure some recovery to a plaintiff injured by a defendant’s
negligence, even when the plaintiff has also been negligent. At
the same time, however, the plaintiff’s comparative negligence
can work to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery beyond that contemplated by the law.

Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park, and Peter Salovey conducted
a mock juror experiment using comparative negligence cases,
and found participants appeared to attribute more fault to
plaintiffs than was justified by the scenario facts.13 Mock jurors
read about the actions of both the defendant and the plaintiff
as well as the severity of the plaintiff’s injury in four accident
scenarios. Participants answered a series of questions about the
plaintiff and the defendant, and attributed percentages of fault
to both the plaintiff and the defendant. They were then asked
to give two damage awards—a gross damage award that represented the total damage associated with the injury and an
adjusted damage award that discounted the award to account
for plaintiff fault. In an actual jury trial, this adjustment for
plaintiff fault is typically done by the judge once the jury’s
damage award is submitted.
As expected, high plaintiff responsibility led to a higher
apportionment of fault to the plaintiff. The damage awards,
however, showed a striking pattern. Recall that from a legal
perspective, the initial, unadjusted damage award should not
reflect a discount for plaintiff responsibility, but should represent the full cost of the plaintiff’s injuries. The adjustment
takes place afterwards, when the percentage of plaintiff fault is
taken into account and a proportionate amount is deducted
from the full compensatory award number to arrive at the
adjusted award. What Feigenson and his colleagues discovered, however, was that the initial, unadjusted damage awards
were significantly lower in the conditions in which the plaintiff was described as also blameworthy. The award to the plaintiff, therefore, was discounted twice—once when jurors made
their initial valuation of the plaintiff’s total damages and again
when those damages were reduced to take account of the
plaintiff’s responsibility.
Researchers have also found evidence of double discounting
in patterns of real-world torts. In a study of automobile-accident cases, researchers found that initial damage assessments
were systematically lower in cases with partially negligent
plaintiffs, declining “almost in proportion to the plaintiff’s negligence.”14 The researchers concluded that “awards to negligent plaintiffs are double discounted—the jury reports smaller
(gross) damages, which the court (or jury) further discounts in
accordance with the plaintiff’s negligence.”15
Psychologically, it is not surprising that participants would
reduce an award to take into account the plaintiff’s responsibility for his or her own injury. A holistic perspective that
takes relative responsibility into account is part of why comparative negligence seems fair to many observers. And we
have already seen the holistic approach that was said to be
practiced by juries who decided cases under regimes of contributory negligence, with juries adjusting plaintiff responsibility and awards downward rather than eliminating the pos-

12. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
13. Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park & Peter Salovey, Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility
and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1997). For another demonstration of double
discounting of plaintiff fault, see Douglas J. Zickafoose & Brian H.
Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negli-

gence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577
(1999).
14. James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll & Daniel A. Relles, Tort
Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 756–58
(1985).
15. Id. at 757.

[T]he plaintiff’s
comparative
negligence can
work to reduce
the plaintiff’s
recovery beyond
that contemplated
by the law.
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sibility of any recovery for negligent plaintiffs.
It is reasonable to expect to find that the parties’ relative
responsibility contributes to the jurors’ underlying sense of
deserved damages.16 However, the structure imposed on the
fact finders’ decision making in comparative-negligence cases
results in double discounting. An initial reduction occurs
implicitly as fact finders calculate the total gross-damageaward amount, and a second reduction occurs when the percentage of plaintiff responsibility is used to adjust the award
amount. In effect, the plaintiff is penalized twice for the same
negligent behavior.
How might judges manage the problem of double discounting? Maine has adopted an interesting approach to the problem
of double discounting. In Maine, the judge instructs the jury to
return both an assessment of the total damages and an adjusted
damages figure. The judge informs the jury that it should
“reduce the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent deemed just and equitable, having regard
to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damages.”17
The judge reminds the jury that the lower figure will be the
final verdict. It would be interesting to study whether Maine’s
approach to comparative negligence is an effective way to
address the possibility of double discounting.
Divergence can also be seen in other areas. Imagine, for
example, a case alleging that a doctor was negligent in failing
to identify the presence of a cancerous tumor in a patient’s Xray. A recent scan clearly shows the tumor, and the patient
alleges that the doctor should have detected it in the earlier Xray as well. Had the cancer been detected earlier, the patient’s
prognosis would have been much better. The difficulty for the
fact finder (and for any medical experts called to testify) is that
the assessment of the earlier X-ray is inevitably conducted with
the knowledge now possessed—the fact that we now know
about the tumor.18
But legal determinations of whether particular conduct is
reasonable are supposed to be made from an ex ante perspective, judging the reasonableness of the conduct before the consequences of the chosen action were known. As Prosser and
Keeton note,

quences. It is not enough
that everyone can see now
that the risk was great, if it
was not apparent when the
conduct occurred.19

Research in
psychology . . .
has demonstrated
that people have
difficulty taking a
forward-looking
perspective
when making
judgments in
hindsight.

The actor’s conduct must be judged in the light of the
possibilities apparent to him at the time, and not by
looking backward “with the wisdom born of the event.”
The standard is one of conduct, rather than of conse-

Research in psychology,
however, has demonstrated that
people have difficulty taking a
forward-looking perspective
when making judgments in
hindsight. The hindsight bias
makes it difficult to figure out
what predictions one would
have made in foresight.20 When
outcome information is known, other information about the
event can be reconstrued in light of that outcome, creating an
integrated picture of the event and its outcome that is hard to
disentangle and leading to a feeling that one “knew it all
along.” Of particular importance for tort law, people “not only
tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable, but
also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively inevitable’ before it
happened. People believe that others should have been able to
anticipate events much better than was actually the case.”21
A related phenomenon, the outcome bias, occurs when people judge the quality of a decision based on its outcome. That
is, decisions resulting in negative consequences are judged to
have been bad decisions.22 Thus, for example, people tend to
judge the quality of the same medical decision more favorably
when the treatment turns out to be successful than when it
does not.23
Hindsight biases have implications for the types of judgments and decisions required of experts and fact finders in tort
cases, as they will typically know that harm has in fact
occurred. Hindsight and outcome biases are likely to affect
judgments about the range of risks that were foreseeable,
whether a particular risk was foreseeable, the likelihood that a
particular risk would materialize, and estimates of the likely
severity of harm. In the aftermath of an injury, the risk of loss
is likely to seem significant and any precautions taken are
likely to seem less reasonable.
Experimental studies that have explored the hindsight bias
in the context of tort litigation support these predictions.
Susan LaBine and Gary LaBine, for example, compared judg-

16. Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2011).
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, § 156.
18. Example adapted from Neal J. Roese & Kathleen D. Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 411 (2012).
19. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (5th ed.
1984).
20. For reviews of the research demonstrating the hindsight bias, see
Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 147 (1991); Rebecca L. Guilbault, Fred Bryant, Jennifer

Howard Brockway & Emil Posavac, A Meta-Analysis of Research
on Hindsight Bias, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 103 (2004);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
21. Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 428 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (emphasis added).
22. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision
Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988);
Philip J. Mazzocco, Mark D. Alicke & Theresa L. Davis, On the
Robustness of Outcome Bias, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 131
(2004).
23. See, e.g., Baron & Hershey, supra note 22, at 571–72.
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ments about therapists’ assessments of patient dangerousness
in foresight and hindsight.
When mock jurors were told
that the patient became violent,
they rated the actions taken by
the therapist as being less reasonable, were more likely to
believe that the therapist
should have done more, thought that the violence was more
foreseeable, and were more likely to believe that they would
have predicted violence themselves than did mock jurors who
did not have this hindsight information. Ultimately, mock
jurors were more likely to find that the therapist was negligent
when they were told that a violent outcome had occurred (24
percent) than when no violence resulted (6 percent) or when
the outcome was not specified (9 percent).24
A similar study compared judges’ evaluation of a physician’s
decision to grant a resident of a psychiatric ward permission to
leave the facility for three hours. The resident then escaped
and caused significant harm. Judges who were told of the disastrous consequences thought that it was more foreseeable that
harm would occur than did judges who assessed the foreseeability of harm in foresight. In addition, only 12 percent of
judges judging in foresight believed that the physician’s decision was negligent, while 30 percent of those judging in hindsight indicated that they believed that the physician’s decision
was negligent.25
The hindsight bias has proven to be difficult to overcome in
the legal context. Therefore, some scholars have suggested
bifurcating trials or otherwise structuring proceedings so that
fact finders do not know the specific consequences of the decision or conduct at issue, using a clear and convincing standard
for determining negligence, increasing reliance on strict liability or the regulatory system, or allowing for increased deference to industry standards and practice guidelines.26
Others are more optimistic, noting aspects of the current
system that may work to minimize or offset hindsight bias.27
The most effective debiasing technique—considering alternatives to the outcome that occurred—is inherent in an adversarial system in which the other side often proposes an alter-

native scenario for fact finders to consider. Other tort system
features that may help are the existing reliance on deviation
from custom as evidence of negligence and the availability of
comparative-negligence rules. In addition, the hindsight effect
may be smaller in the kinds of situations that result in tort lawsuits. Negative outcomes, real-world events, and tasks that
require subjective assessments of the probability of risk tend to
produce weaker hindsight effects.28 Given that tort lawsuits
tend to involve real-world case scenarios that have resulted in
negative outcomes, that opposing sides present alternative
conceptualizations of the case, and that fact finders are not
required to provide numerical probability estimates, we might
expect attenuated hindsight effects in evaluations of legal
cases.

24. Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and
the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996). For
another demonstration of hindsight bias on mock jurors, see Kim
A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (using a
scenario based on Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708
(2d Cir. 1964)).
25. Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goekenjan, When Being Wise After the
Event Results in Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges’ Negligence Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 271 (2016). For
other demonstrations of hindsight bias in judges, see Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”:
An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J.
1477 (2009). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, &

Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, Probability, & Hindsight, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72 (2011) (finding some evidence that
hindsight bias influences judges’ assessments of the likely outcome of a search, but not their legal judgments of probable
cause).
For a review, see Jennifer K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW (2016).
The Restatement notes that “if there is such a [hindsight] bias, it
is one that the negligence system evidently finds generally acceptable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. g (2010).
See Guilbault et al., supra note 20.
TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). See also Tom R.
Tyler, Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375
(2006).

The hindsight
bias has proven
to be difficult to
overcome in the
legal context.

114 Court Review - Volume 53

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have described a number of instances in which the links
between tort law and practice have converged with lay intuitions of justice, and others in which they have diverged. Convergence helps to explain the direction of shifts in tort law doctrine, where community sentiment helps to shape, and in turn
is shaped by, tort law.
But when paths diverge, when public views and tort law do
not coincide, the legitimacy of the tort system may suffer as a
result. The legitimacy of the legal system, including the rules
and practices of tort law, depends a great deal on public acceptance. To the extent that the law departs from deeply held intuitions, tort law risks being perceived as illegitimate. Tom Tyler
has empirically examined the consequences of public support
or lack of support for legal authorities and the legal system,
investigating why people obey the law.29 Many of us might
assume that people obey the law because of the criminal punishments or civil consequences that come from violating it.
Indeed, this is the crux of the deterrence argument in tort law:
We establish civil sanctions to attempt to shape conduct in
desirable ways.
Tyler argues, however, that a prime reason that most people
obey the law is that they believe in the law’s legitimacy. Compliance with the law is linked to its moral credibility. When
those in authority enact laws that are out of step with the public’s sense of justice and fairness, the authorities and the legal

26.
27.

28.
29.

system may lose credibility and legitimacy. Declining legitimacy, in turn, reduces a legal system’s ability to control conduct. Indeed, the dystopian image of tort law widely promulgated by tort-reform groups may already have led to decline in
public perceptions of the tort system’s legitimacy.
As we have described, legal decision makers may respond to
divergence between their views and the law through creative
fact finding and other mechanisms that allow them to achieve
what they consider to be justice in a particular case. People
may adjust their perceptions of the parties and the evidence so
that they align better with their ideas of a fair ultimate outcome. Recall how perceptions of plaintiff fault are modified
under contributory fault regimes to permit some recovery for
the plaintiff even when strict adherence to the tort law rule
would lead to no recovery. In essence, people walk where they
want to, creating paths that serve their goals and taking small
detours to accommodate the formal letter of the law.
In some instances of divergence, however, taking psychological predispositions and social norms into account might
undermine the purposes of tort law. Consider the impact of
implicit racial bias, which may lead fact finders to devalue the
injuries of racial and ethnic minorities. Here, other important
social and political values lead us to insist that the community
must walk on the path laid by the law.
Psychologists have begun to study debiasing remedies, testing the effectiveness of techniques aimed at limiting the impact
of psychological heuristics and other biases.30 Some hopeful
evidence of this is found in research on jury instructions about
damages. In general, legal instructions may be admonitions
that are akin to “Keep Off” signs, and may have similarly modest effects. But legal instructions to jurors that include reasons
and explanations about the purposes of the law can be more
effective in helping jurors make decisions that are consistent
with the law, even when the law goes against their intuitions.31
Ultimately, psychological intuitions and the purposes of tort
law will interact to determine the path that tort law takes. At
times, convergence between psychology and tort law will fur-

30. JAMES M. JONES, JOHN F. DOVIDIO & DEBORAH L. VIETZE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY: BEYOND PREJUDICE AND RACISM (2014).

ther the overall purposes of the tort system, deterring tortious
conduct and promoting just compensation. In other circumstances, the same policies of deterrence and compensation will
be better served by demanding that psychological intuitions be
put aside. In either case, understanding the relevant intuitions
and the many other ways that psychology influences the real
world of tort law and practice will make it more likely that the
tort system will find the best path.
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